Early work on security-typed languages required that legal information flows be defined statically. More recently, techniques have been introduced that relax these assumptions and allow policies to change at run-time. For example, the Rx language uses a policy language based on RT, a trust management framework for representing authorization policies. While Rx made significant strides toward the goal of allowing policy updates in security-typed languages, in this paper we observe that certain design choices of Rx violate the privacy and autonomy requirements of principals in trust management systems, thus making decentralized control over information difficult. To address these problems, we propose RTI, a new security-typed language. In addition to avoiding prior pitfalls, RTI's most distinguishing characteristic is that it supports fine-grained specification of security for dynamic policy. We also provide a proof of noninterference for RTI.
Introduction
Increasingly, applications must operate on data that is subject to regulatory and corporate requirements regarding confidentiality and integrity. From medical data to customer profiles, the exact ways in which the data can be used and modified depends on the stated wishes of the client and the terms under which the data were collected. Even the client's decisions on how the data can be used may be sensitive and subject to data integrity concerns and regulatory oversight. Furthermore, the wishes of the client may change over time, requiring corresponding changes in the usage policy associated with the data. Operating-system-based security can ensure that an application does not read high security data and then write to low security channels. However, this granularity is too coarse for individual applications that must work with data having many different usage policies, such as sets of medical records or customer profiles.
Example 1 (Medical Records Management).
A hospital patient Alice may have a policy allowing only the doctors in the hospital and her adult daughter to view her medical record. She may also prefer her stay in the hospital to be kept private. If Alice wants a specialist from another hospital to look at her record, she should be able to specify a new policy to this effect.
These applications typically process data belonging to several distinct individuals or organizations with different privacy and authority requirements. Within limits posed by legal requirements, individuals need to have autonomy in defining portions of policy that control how their data is used. To accommodate decentralized control over information, we also need to minimize the amount of coordination required between different individuals or organizations as they work to define the policies. The individuals may also choose to keep their information private and we need to provide flexible ways to define such policies.
Example 2 (Requirements for a Policy Manager). Within certain limits imposed by regulations, Alice should be able to specify her own policies for how her data can be used. She may choose to delegate to the hospital some authority to control who can view and modify her data. For example, Alice can set up her policies so that when a new doctor joins the hospital, Alice's records can be shown to him without any change to her policies. However, Alice's policy should be sufficiently well protected that a medical-supplies manufacturer cannot view or modify her policy.
To program such an application, we need a way to effectively define and enforce such policies in the program. Trust management frameworks provide a way to define policies and credentials for distributed authorization, and are a good candidate for defining the policies for applications such as those mentioned above. Language-based security research seeks to provide flexible and efficient methods to automatically enforce fine-grained confidentiality and integrity policies during program execution. For the past decade, researchers in this area have worked on the problems of how to specify a desired policy in a programming language, how to enforce the policy efficiently and, more recently, how to deal with changes in policy.
Security-typed languages have been one of the most active branches of language-based security research over the last decade. In this approach, the data types of program variables are annotated with security labels, and a lattice label ordering is used to specify the legal information flows among labeled variables. The type-checking rules verify that information flow in the program adheres to the label ordering and type-checking thereby enforces the security policy. If the program type-checks with respect to a policy, it does not have illegal information flows. This enforces very fine-grained (variable-level) information flow control.
While early work in this area required that legal information flows be defined quite statically, in recent years new techniques have relaxed these assumptions, enabling policies to change [5, 11, 27, 28, 30] . Two of these works introduced techniques whereby the interpretation of the information flow policies depends on the principals interacting with the system [28, 30] . Two others introduced methods for updating the policies that define legal information flows within the program [11, 27] . One of the most recent works, Rx [27] , used a policy language based on RT, a trust management framework for representing authorization policies [14] . Although Rx makes several important innovations, as we shall see, its design makes several mistakes with respect to subtle, but essential aspects of the integration of security-typed languages and trust management.
In Rx, the security type of a variable x is given by two RT roles, one that specifies x's confidentiality policy (i.e., who can read the value of x), and one for x's integrity policy (i.e., who trusts the integrity of the value of x). A program's security policy is a set of RT policy statements. Rx employs static type-checking rules and also novel dynamic semantics. At run-time, the executing program has access to a set of policy statements. These statements form the dynamic policy and can be used to determine the control flow of the program. Rx also includes constructs to add and delete policy statements dynamically during program execution. The policy changes affect the semantics of a role and therefore change the ways in which program variables can legally be used. In a sense, using roles as the basis of security labels introduces a level of indirection that enables policy changes to change program behavior without modifying the program. While there are several security policy models that are based on roles, notably RBAC [25] , control over policy definition in these models is usually highly centralized, which is contrary to our design goals.
Example 3 (Rx Policy Updates). Suppose that Alice wants specialist Bob from another hospital to view her record. In an Rx program, she can add the new statement Alice.record ← Bob on the fly. If Bob specializes in a disease that Alice does not want everyone to know that she has, then Alice will want to keep this policy statement private. (Though, of course, if it is to have any effect, the policy statement cannot be kept private from Bob.)
The previous example shows that security policies themselves can potentially become inappropriate conduits of information. To avoid this problem, Rx gives roles the same kinds of protection as provided for program variables, in the form of a pair of metapolicies (C(ρ), I(ρ)) associated with each role ρ. Confidentiality policy C(ρ) identifies principals authorized to know the members of ρ, and integrity policy I(ρ) identifies principals that trust that the membership of ρ is defined correctly. The latter is significant principally when values given to output channels 1 depend on how that membership is defined. In that case, everyone that trusts the data integrity of the value of the output channel has to trust the way the membership of ρ is defined. As explained in section 8, this would mean that Rx allows inappropriate principals to influence the definitions of roles.
Also, in the kinds of applications trust management is intended for, the choice of roles as the unit that is protected has undesirable ramifications owing simply to the coarseness the unit. For example, every member of an Rx role is entitled to learn who all the other members of that role are. In the real world, role membership is often sensitive. But in Rx, not only is every role member authorized to know that one is in the role, but also, because of information-flow requirements, to know why one is in the role. If one gets a certain service because one is HIV positive, one probably does not want everyone else authorized for the service to know this.
To address these problems, we propose RTI, a new security-typed language that builds on Rx's approach to the use of RT roles as security types, while addressing the privacy and autonomy concerns of individual principals 2 . RTI uses role-based labels in programs, and uses trust management principles to allow policy creators to control who can access and update each individual policy statement. A principal needs to be authorized to know the existence of policy statements that prove his membership in each of his roles; he does not need to know the other members in the role. RTI also introduces language constructs for querying and modifying policy statements that are persistent run-time values protected according to security labels that are themselves run-time values. These constructs are designed to control information flow via these policy statements in a manner that interacts cleanly with the rest of the language constructs, in which information flow is controlled by purely static means. The main contributions of this paper are:
• We observe that privacy of role membership and autonomy over defining ones own policy are important requirements for flexible policy management in a decentralized environment.
• We present the RTI programming language, which embodies design choices that satisfy these requirements.
• RTI introduces language constructs that are designed to control information flow via policy statements that are persistent run-time values and that are protected according to security labels that are themselves runtime values.
• We present a noninterference theorem for RTI.
• We present a comprehensive study of the design choices in Rx and identify their shortcomings with respect to the above requirements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews RT. Section 3 presents the key design features of RTI that distinguish it from prior work. Section 4 introduces the RTI language. Section 5 presents recommended idioms for uniformly specifying labels for policy statements and variables. Section 6 gives an example program written in RTI that illustrates how the dynamic policy can be changed in RTI and how doing so affects the program execution. The example is used to illustrate the static and dynamic semantics, as well as the recommended security-label idiom. Section 7 presents the RTI noninterference theorem. Section 8 describes the problems with Rx and how RTI resolves them. Section 9 describes related work. We conclude in section 10. Our noninterference theorem and proof follow that of Rx and therefore we omit that from the main paper due to lack of space.
Background: RT Overview
RT is a family of languages [14, 13] whose simplest member has been called RT[ ] because it contains no optional features (which, if they existed, would be listed between the brackets) [15] . The basic constructs in RT are principals and role names. We use A, B, D, and P , often with subscripts, to denote principals and r, u, and w to denote role names. A role is given by a principal followed by a role name, separated by a dot, e.g., A.r and B.r 1 ; we use ρ to denote roles. A role defines a set of principals that are its members. Each principal A has the sole authority to designate the members of each role of the form A.r, which it does by signing policy statements. Each statement has the form A.r ← e, in which e is a principal or a role. We read "←" as "includes", and say the policy statement defines A.r.
•
Simple Membership:
This statement means that A asserts that D is a member of A's r role.
• A policy π is a set of policy statements. The semantics of roles is given by translating the statements in π into a set SP (π) of definite Horn clauses that obey the Datalog restrictions shown below. We use x, y, and z to denote Datalog variables, which in this case range over principals.
The semantics of a Datalog program such as SP (π) can be defined through several equivalent approaches. Viewing SP (π) as a set of first-order sentences, we write SP (π) |= m(A, r, D) when m(A, r, D) is logically entailed by SP (π) 3 . Given a policy π, the semantics of a role A.r is given by
RTI Design Choices
In this section we motivate the manner in which RT[ ] is incorporated into RTI by appealing to established trustmanagement principles.
Role owners should have autonomy. A readers-oriented view of integrity says that "if the assignment x := y is to be allowed, every principal who trusts the integrity of the value of x must also trust the integrity of y". A writersoriented view says that "every principal that is trusted to define the value of y must also be trusted to define the value of x." In most contexts, a readers-oriented view of integrity is essentially interchangeable with a writers-oriented view, which says that everyone who is allowed to define the value of y must also be allowed to define the value of x [16, 28] . However when RT roles are used to define these sets of principals, the readers-oriented view, used in prior work in the area [27] , runs counter to the need that control over the use of information be retained by the information's owner. We illustrate this conflict with the following example.
Example 4 (Readers-oriented Integrity). Alice should allow the doctors at her hospital to write entries in her medical record. Assume the integrity labels of the updated record y and Alice's permanent record x are Hospital.doctor and Alice.record, respectively. If the assignment x := y is to be allowed, then every member of Hospital.doctor must also be a member of Alice.record. This is achieved in RT[ ] if the policy includes the statement Hospital.doctor ← Alice.record. Because the role in the head of this rule belongs to the hospital, according to RT's design, the hospital controls whether or not this statement is in the policy, so Alice has no control over whether the doctor is authorized to modify her record.
A writers-oriented view of integrity fits RT much better.
Example 5 (Writers-oriented Integrity). Under a writersoriented approach to integrity, once Alice adds the policy statement Alice.record ← Hospital.doctor, the value of a variable y having type Hospital.doctor can be assigned to a variable x having type Alice.record. With writers-oriented integrity, Alice controls who can change the information in her medical record.
These observations give a clear preference for the writers-oriented interpretation when working in a trust management-style policy language such as RT[ ]. RTI integrity labels take the writers-oriented approach for this reason.
Preserve privacy of role-members. Focusing on confidentiality for the moment and ignoring integrity, if the confidentiality label of variable x consists of role ρ, then members of ρ must be permitted to know that they are members of ρ. Otherwise their membership in ρ cannot permit them to view variable x as intended. To see this, assume the principal in question knows that x has confidentiality ρ. Then, if the principal can see the value x, he knows he is in ρ. If the latter is not permitted, he cannot be permitted to see x.
Prior work using RT[ ] roles as labels [27] has protected policy at the role level. This means that one cannot be permitted to know that one is a member without also being permitted to know of every other member's membership. That is to say, it is not possible to differentiate between a role member's right to know about his own membership and his right to know that the other members of ρ are members of ρ. This can be quite undesirable: suppose Hospital.HIV patients contains all HIV patients at the hospital; if role-level protection is used, every member of this role needs to have permission to know of every other member's membership.
To avoid this and related problems, RTI protects individual policy statements rather than memberships of entire roles. This obviates the need for each member of a role to be authorized to know all the role's members. Managing control dependence. Because the labels of policy statements are dynamic values in RTI, a type-based solution to avoiding illegal flows requires new language features. The approach we use is to establish statically a bound on the security level of policy statements that will be considered when the policy is consulted at run-time. This bound is used to ensure that low security assignments and policy updates will not have control dependence on high security policy statements. In fact, suitable values for these bounds are easily inferred by using the type system presented in the next section.
The RTI Language
RTI is a simple imperative language with additional features that support (1) role-based security labels on variables (static labels) and on policy statements (run-time labels), (2) dynamic updates to security policy, and (3) conditions based on queries against that policy. In this section, we present RTI syntax, issues related to protecting policy statements with dynamic security labels, RTI's label ordering, its operational semantics, and its static semantics (i.e., typechecking rules). Figure 1 presents a grammar for RTI syntax. Like most of the previous approaches for security-typed languages, RTI adds a static security label to each each program variable's data type t, forming t . As is commonly done, a security label in RTI is actually a pair of labels CL, IL . A join of principals and roles, CL represents the confidentiality level; IL is a meet of principals and roles, and represents the integrity level of the associated variable. CL denotes all the principals that can view the information bearing that label. IL denotes all the principals that can modify the contents of the variable-the writers-oriented interpretation of integrity.
RTI Syntax
In RTI, policy statements also have this kind of two-part labels, though in this case, the labels are dynamic objects as well as static. As we discuss below in section 4.5, the type-checking rules also use security bounds, b, to annotate the statements of the program. Security bounds resemble security labels, but have a slightly more general syntactic form, as explained below in section 4.3. Apart from the normal data-types in the programming language, the RTI language also has a special type 'pol' for typing a set of updates.
A policy statement, s, is an RT[ ] statement. In the context of confidentiality, ρ 1 ← κ means that the value of a variable with label ρ 1 can flow to a variable labeled κ. In the context of integrity, ρ 1 ← κ means that a variable labeled ρ 1 can be written to by a variable labeled κ.
The policy, Π, is a run-time structure that consists of a set of (policy statement, label) pairs s, ∈ Π. The presence principal P roles ρ ::= P.r atomic labels κ ::= ρ | P policy statements s ::= ρ ← κ queries q ::= κ1 κ2 one-property confidentiality labels CL ::= κ | CL1 CL2 types t ::= . . . | pol one-property integrity labels IL ::= κ | IL1 IL2 security types τ ::= t one-property confidentiality bounds CB ::= CL | CB 1 CB 2 two-property labels ::= (CL, IL) one-property integrity bounds
of s, ∈ Π indicates that observers that have a security level dominating are permitted see that s is in Π. Note that if any observer sees s as being in Π, then s is in fact in Π. It is impossible for the view of a low observer to show s is in Π, while a high observer sees that s is not in Π. The statements s in Π define the label ordering. The RTI programming language consists of three new statements in addition to a simple imperative programming language: a conditional statement that queries the dynamic policy, a policy update statement, and a try statement that is used to safely encapsulate policy updates. A policy query, q, tests whether two atomic labels are ordered. The thenbranch of the conditional containing q is compiled under the assumption that this relationship holds. In this way, a static approximation of the dynamic policy is built up within nested conditionals. This approximation Q, consisting of a set of order relationships, is used by the type system to determine the security of information flows.
The policy update statement supports addition and deletion of policy statements during the execution of the program. A try statement, try Q S, consists of a policy context Q containing all the policy queries used in it's body S. The syntax ensures that policy update statements occur only inside a try statement. It also ensures that the try Q statement is not nested inside a query conditional, and variable assignments do not occur inside try Q blocks. The try statement ensures that updating the dynamic policy at run-time does not create information flows that violate the current policy. This is achieved by breaking out of the try statements upon updating the policy in a manner that changes the result of any of the queries in Q, as is discussed further in section 4.4 below.
Supporting Fine-grained Metapolicy
In RTI, each policy query q is annotated with a bound b = (CB , IB ) that determines which policy statements are used when evaluating the query at run-time. A statement s, ∈ Π is used if 2 b. This ensures that any policy statement that is used is less confidential that CB , and that its integrity must be at least as great as IB . The purpose of using only such policy statements is to ensure that subsequent modifications to public or high integrity output channels (variables or policy statements) does not depend on sensitive or unreliable policy statements used to evaluate the query.
The query bound b is inferred using RTI's static semantics in a manner that ensures it is dominated by the labels of all output channels that are modified in either branch of the query conditional. In this inference process, RTI's static semantics defines the bound on a policy query to be the meet of the labels of the output channels that can be modified within the scope of the policy-query conditional. This has the required effect of ensuring that no information flow restrictions will be violated because of a low security output channel depending on a high security policy statement.
As mentioned in the previous section, RTI's static semantics uses policy-query conditionals to derive a static approximation of the dynamic policy that is in force when a given code region is reached. In the then-branch, the query is assumed to hold. However, within the else-branch one cannot assume that the query does not hold, since in general not all policy statements are used to evaluate the query. In this sense, query evaluation is incomplete in RTI.
Label Ordering
The incompleteness of query evaluation identified above places a significant requirement on the order relation . It needs to be monotonic in the sense that adding statements to the policy can cause a false query to become true, but not a true query to become false. This is necessary because the then-branch of a conditional that tests whether a query is true is type-checked under the assumption that the ordering relationship given by the query in fact holds. With a non-monotonic order relation, it would be possible for the query to evaluate to true because only low security policy statements can be considered in the context where the query happens to occur, while it would fail to hold if the full policy were used. Clearly this would make it unsound to typecheck the then-branch under the assumption that the query holds.
Unfortunately, the ordering relation used in Rx, the prior work using RT[ ]-based security labels, is not monotonic. In Rx, given a dynamic policy π, the judgment π ρ 1 Rx ρ 2 is defined to hold if
The following example illustrates that this ordering is not monotonic.
Example 6. Consider the policies π 1 = {A.r ← D, B.r 1 ← D} and π 2 = π 1 ∪ {B.r 1 ← E}. We have π 1 A.r Rx B.r 1 , but π 2 A.r Rx B.r 1 .
To achieve monotonicity, RTI uses a stronger ordering relation that is based on logical entailment, rather than on subset ordering. In RTI, π A.r RT I B.r 1 if SP (π) |= ∀x.m(B, r 1 , x) ⇒ m(A, r, x). Henceforth in this paper we omit the subscript, writing simply for RT I . This ordering requires that in all models of π, the implication holds-not only in the minimal model. The policy π is a set of policy statements {s 1 , . . . , s n }. It should be thought of consisting of the policy statements that are visible at some security level. We use a bound function, given by the notation Π b , to calculate such a π at run-time. The expression Π b denotes the subset of Π consisting of statements that are visible at the security level given by b. As we must take care not to leak information about high security policy statements that could help prove that some is dominated by b, we define Π b to be the greatest fixpoint of a monotonic function f b : ℘(Π) → ℘(Π), projected onto the statements:
As shown in figure 1 , one-property confidentiality and integrity labels are, respectively, joins and meets of individual atomic labels. One-property confidentiality and integrity bounds are, respectively, meets of confidentiality labels and joins of integrity labels. If we take equivalence classes of labels with respect to logical equivalence, this gives us semi-lattices (specifically, a join-semi-lattice for confidentiality labels and meet-semi-lattice for integrity labels.) Taking equivalence classes of each kind of bound yields a full lattice. Fortunately it is not necessary to compare arbitrary elements, as doing so is in general intractable. We show presently that all the comparisons that might occur during the execution of the program can be evaluated by straight-forward decomposition.
Tractable label ordering. We extend to singleproperty labels and bounds as follows. Let L ::
This order relation is easily computed as follows (whenever it is obvious from the context, we elide π in the following computations):
Ordering relationships can be evaluated efficiently because we never have need to evaluate relationships of the form
We use 2 for the order over two-property labels and bounds. Two-property labels are ordered by
Notice the contra-variance with the integrity part of the label; 1 2 2 means that data labeled 1 has lower confidentiality but higher integrity than data labeled 2 . This is the circumstance in which information flow from data labeled 1 to data labeled 2 .
We use the following projection operators, which extract the one-property labels and bounds represented by a twoproperty label and bounds.
The join and meet of two-property labels and bounds are as follows: 
Operational Semantics
The operational semantics of RTI is shown in figure 2 . Each rule in it contributes to the definition of either the relation E, S −→ E , S or the relation E, S E , S . The −→ relation defines one step of execution of the program. The relations represents a break operation, which breaks out of a try statement if a policy update nested therein changes the policy in a way that could violate assumptions under which certain code regions in the try were type checked. The configuration E is defined as follows:
execution configuration E ::= (Π; M ; Ψ) dynamic snapshot Ψ ::= (S )|· An execution configuration E consists of the current dynamic policy, Π, the memory state, M , and a dynamic snapshot, Ψ, consisting of the try Q statement in which the current statement being executed is nested, if any. The key information in Ψ is Q, which is used to determine whether the execution needs to break out of the try statement. The simple imperative programming language constructs follow the standard one-step semantics and therefore are omitted in the paper. The first four rules in figure 2 are used to evaluate the statements inside the try. (E-Tr1) represents the state transition when a try statement is reached. Before a try is entered, the try statement is preserved in the dynamic snapshot. This will be used when evaluating policy updates, giving access to Q, a set that must contain each query accruing inside the try. The set Q is used to determine whether executing a policy update changes the evaluation of any query in the try, in which case execution breaks out of the try per (R-Up), as discussed below. (ETr2) is used when the statement inside the try takes a step. (E-Tr3) marks the end of the try. The dynamic snapshot is reverted to an empty state when the try is exited. Transition (E-Tr4) occurs when the statement in the try breaks. The conditions for the break are given by the (R-Up) rule. If a break occurs when executing an update statement in the try, the execution jumps out of the try statement, per (R-Up), and all statements that follow S 1 in the try are skipped, per (R-Seq).
(E-IfQ) states that if the dynamic policy visible to observers at level b prove query q, then the then-branch of the conditional is executed, otherwise the else-branch is executed.
The (E-Up) and (R-Up) rules define the execution of a policy update statement. Since a policy update can happen only inside a try, (R-Up) and (E-Up) rules require E.Ψ to be non-empty. As part of an update, we must check whether the result of any query in Q is changed as a result of the policy update. If so, it is possible that continuing to execute normally would execute code that was type-checked under assumptions about the policy that no longer hold after the policy update. Doing so would be unsafe. In this case, (RUp) is used to break out of the try. Otherwise, if the result of every query in Q is unchanged, (E-Up) is used. Note that executing according to (R-Up) does result in the policy being updated. Since variable assignments are not allowed inside the try statement, the memory remains the same as it was right before the try statement started its execution. The execution will resume at the statements following the try statement.
In (E-Up) and (R-Up), the function update(Π, ∆) (see figure 2) updates the policy. Deletes are an interesting case of policy updates, which remove only those occurrences of a statement that are at least as protected as the label in the update. If the parameters to a del are s, , then any s, ∈ Π will be removed just in case 2 .
Static Semantics
The policy context, Ω, which is used to type-check the program, can be summarized as follows: typing context Ω ::= (Γ; pc; Q; Q ) Ω is the static typing context, which includes a type binding for variables, Γ, the current program counter, pc, the query context, Q, and another query context Q for type-checking try statements. In addition to labeling each program statement with a bound, RTI uses pc to keep track of the security level of the context. The pc value that is used to type check a given program statement is the least upper bound of the security labels of data inspected in conditionals that determine whether that statement is reached by execution. It is used to ensure that there is no unauthorized information flow from those conditionals to assignments or policy updates occurring in the statement. Similarly, the policy context, Q, keeps track of all the queries encountered to reach a particular program point. The query context, Q , is obtained from the label of the try statement. It consists of all the queries that occur within the try statement.
The static typing rules are given in figure 3 . The static semantics of RTI are defined by the typing relations Ω E : t and Ω S : b cmd. An expression, E, has type t , where t denotes the normal data type of the expression and is a two-property security label. The type of the expression is the least upper bound of the labels of all its sub-expressions.
In Ω S : b cmd, b will be the greatest lower bound of the labels of all output channels that can be modified inside S. This bound is important because policy statements that have labels not dominated by it cannot safely be used to evaluate policy queries that govern conditional execution of S. The impact of this will be seen in our discussion of the (T-IfQ) rule below.
The first set of rules in figure 3 specify the label ordering in RTI. The interpretation of the label ordering under the static policy context Q corresponds to the interpretation of the ordering with respect to the dynamic policy Π as defined in Section 4.3.
The (T-AddDel1) rule types the expression with the policy type and the security level associated with the policy statement. The (T-AddDel2) rule specifies the security level of a set of add or del commands as the greatest lower bound of all the levels of individual add or del commands. Note that (T-AddDel1) and (T-AddDel2) verify that the labels of statements that are added or removed from the policy are at least as restrictive as the pc.
The (T-Assign), (T-Seq), and (T-IfE) give the typing rules for the normal assignment, sequential statements and the conditionals, respectively. For an assignment statement to type-check, the level of the output variable should dominate the level of the input expression, to disallow illegal direct flows. In addition, to prevent illegal control flows, the level of the output variable should dominate the pc. Additionally, since the level of the output channel is 1 , the type of the assignment statement is 1 cmd. The type rules for (T-Seq) and (T-IfE) are typed similar to those in previous approaches.
The (T-IfQ) rule defines the conditions for the query conditional statement to type-check. The value of b in the query can actually be inferred by using this rule, based on the values of b 1 and b 2 in the premise of this rule. The query q, b is added to Q, the policy context, for the purpose of typechecking the then-branch of the conditional. If both thenand else-branches type-check, they yield bounds b 1 and b 2 that correspond to the greatest lower bound of all the output channels in each of the respective branches. The bound b = b 1 b 2 on the whole conditional is again a greatest lower bound, per the third premise. Notice that there is no need to modify the pc when descending into the branches of the conditional. This is because the operational semantics prevents information from policy statements that are used to evaluate the query q from flowing illegally to to output channels inside the conditional. The operational semantics does this by ensuring that q is evaluated by using only statements that are visible at security level b.
The (T-Try) rule says that if the statements inside the try block type-check, the try statement type-checks too. The (T-Up) rule defines the conditions under which the policy can be updated. The type of the update statement pol b is given by the greatest lower bound of the types of all the policy statements in ∆. The policy context Q consists of all queries that must be satisfied to reach the update statement. If any of the queries in Q should be falsified at run-time by the update statement, a break must occur; hence the second premise requires Q ⊆ Q , as Q is the set checked dynamically by the update.
Recommended Idiom for Metapolicy
The RTI approach to protecting policy imposes some requirements on the labels of policy statements and variables. This section explains how these labels can be defined appropriately in RTI.
The first requirement, mentioned above in section 3, is that D should be able to see the statement A.r ← D and all members of B.r 1 should be able to see the statement A.r ← B.r 1 . Otherwise D and the members of B.r 1 would gain no benefit from these respective policy statements. Furthermore, any variable x having confidentiality label A.r should have as part of its integrity label that the writers trusted to participate in defining the membership of A.r are trusted by x.
Consider an assignment x := y in which the confidentiality labels of x and y are A.r and C.r 2 respectively. To
Γ; pc; Q; Q E : t Γ; pc ; Q; Q S1 : b1 cmd Γ; pc ; Q; Q S2 : b2 cmd Γ; pc; Q; Q if(E) S1 S2 : b1 b2 cmd A.r. The statements that will prove that relation at run-time will need to be trusted according to the integrity label of x. Suppose those statements are A.r ← B.r 1 and B.r 1 ← C.r 2 . Now whatever other writers may be allowed to influence the addition of these statements, the owners of the roles being defined certainly must be. This shows that in this case the integrity label of x needs to be at most as restrictive as the integrity labels of A.r ← B.r 1 and B.r 1 ← C.r 2 . In the rest of this section we present a recommended idiom, and RTI features that support it, which facilitates management of integrity labels.
In RT, authority to specify policy statements that define a role A.r rests solely with the owner A. In RTI, authority to specify or modify a statement is controlled by the statement's integrity label. This authority interacts with the integrity labels of values that depend on these statements and on which the definition of these statements depend. To align Q P1.r1 P2.r2 Q P 1 .r 1 P 2 .r 2 Q P .r P
Figure 4. Additional Static Type Checking Rules for Idiom
the RTI integrity labels of policy statement precisely with the nature of authority over policy statements in RT, the integrity label of each policy statement A.r ← e would be just the principal A. Indeed, in the idiom presented here, the statement A.r ← e is given integrity label A. It is straightforward to generalize this to allow A to define a role, the members of which are delegated authority over the definition of A.r. In practice, this is likely to be important so as to enable policy updates to depend on data from other sources. However, for reasons of pedagogy and space, we refrain from introducing this generalization here.
Example 9 (Policy Statement Integrity). Principals A, B, and D add the following statements to the policy Π:
Suppose that variables x and y have labels (E.r 4 , A.r IL x ) and (D.r 3 , C.r 2 IL y ), respectively. Below we will consider the appropriate values for IL x and IL y . Consider the following code fragment: if( D.r 3 E.r 4 , (E.r 4 , A.r IL x ) ) if( A.r C.r 2 , (E.r 4 , A.r IL x ) ) x := y In this example, there are two integrity requirements for the assignment to x to be legal. The first of these is
which means that anyone authorized to define the value of y is also authorized to define the value of x. The second integrity requirement is that the policy statements used to satisfy the two queries in the containing conditionals also must have integrity that is at least as restrictive as that of x.
In other words, we require
According to trust-management principles, the use of a role such as A.r in the label of a variable x is appropriate only if A is trusted to determine an appropriate membership for A.r, which includes trusting that when A delegates to some other principal B some authority over the definition of A.r, B too is trusted for this purpose. Requirements (4) and (5) illustrate the constraints that must be satisfied by the labels IL x and IL y if the assignment is to be legal. To facilitate defining the components of integrity labels like IL x and IL y , RTI implicitly defines and maintains a shadow role, A .r , for each role A.r as a side-effect of adding a new policy statement. The shadow role A .r is defined to include all principals that have authority to define statements that add principals to A.r.
Suppose that for each of statements (1), (2), and (3), we were to add two statements to the dynamic policy:
We will not actually add these statements; instead we will extend the definition of what it means for a static or dynamic policy to satisfy queries that involve shadow roles. Now in our example, the minimum values that satisfy these constraints are IL x = A .r D .r 3 and IL y = C .r 2 D .r 3 . In general, the integrity label of any variable x should be the meet of the following: (1) any trusted writers of the value of x; (2) P .r for each (non-shadow) role P.r appearing in the integrity label of x; plus, optionally, (3) P .r for each (non-shadow) role P.r appearing in the confidentiality label of any variable y or policy statement upon which x's value should be allowed to depend and the confidentiality label of which is not identical to that of x. This is why the shadow role D .r 3 is included in the label of x in the example. Component (3) can be omitted, if the owner of x prefers not to trust the owner of the confidentiality label of y. In this case the assignment x := y is permitted only if ∅ |lab(Γ(y))| C |lab(Γ(x))| C . By a similar analysis, it turns out that the integrity labels of policy statements should be composed in the manner.
To support this idiom, we add the type rules shown in figure 4 and we extend the definition of π κ 1 κ 2 as follows:
π P .r P holds for all π, P, and r π P 1 .r 1 P 2 .r 2 if π P 1 .r 1 P 2 .r 2
An Example
Let us look at the example program in figure 5 and illustrate how the program is type-checked and evaluated in RTI. Specifying Security Labels: All integrity labels in the example adhere to the idiom introduced in the previous section. The confidentiality labels on the policy statements added in lines 4 and 6 have been selected to accommodate the high confidentiality of PatRequestsHIVtherapy. Specifically, when the queries in the conditionals on lines 3 and 5 are satisfied, 1 and 2 dominate 0 , the label of PatRequestsHIVtherapy. In practice, the code fragment comprising lines 1 through 6 needs to be executed only once for a given patient, while lines 7 through 10 might be executed many times.
Static Typing: The type of the update statement in line 4 is obtained by using the (T-AddDel1) static typing rule. The premise of this rule requires that Ω.Q pc 2 1 . The pc is set to 0 by the conditional in line 1. At line 4 the pc remains the same as (T-IfQ) has no effect on the pc. The query conditional at line 3 ensures that the set Ω.Q = { Pat.HIVR Hos.HIVDocR, b 1 }. Note that it is always the case that Q Pat Pat. These two relationships combine to prove Ω.Q pc 2 1 . Therefore line 4 type-checks. The query conditional in line 3 can be typed because its label is the same as the label of statement 4. Lines 5 and 6 type-check similarly. The assignment on line 8 type-checks under the context Q 3 = Pat .RecsR DrBob Pat .RecsR ) ; pc = ⊥ in both contexts. This ensures that the query conditionals on line 7 and 9 type-check.
Execution: Before the execution of statement 1, let the dynamic policy, Π, be
Hos.HIVDocW ← DrBob, 7 ,
Pat.HIVR ← Hos.HIVDocR, 1 ,
Pat.HIVR ← Hos.HIVDocW , 2 }
in which 7 = (DrBob, Hos). Policy statements (6) and (7) indicate that Dr.Bob is an HIV specialist. Through policy statements (8) and (9), the patient indicates that HIV doctors that are allowed to read and write HIV-related patient records are authorized to know whether the patient has requested HIV therapy. If PatRequestsHIVtherapy is true, program statements 4 and 6 add two new policy statements to the dynamic policy, which allow the hospital HIV specialists to view and change the patient's health record:
Pat.RecsR ← Hos.HIVDocR, 1
Pat.RecsW ← Hos.HIVDocW , 2
The dynamic policy satisfies the conditionals in statements 8 and 10. The query on line 8 is satisfied by policy statements (6) and (10); these policy statements can both be used to evaluate the query because Π b3 (6) . The query on line 10 is satisfied similarly by using policy statements (7) and (11) . Therefore Dr.Bob can view the patient's records and also give a diagnosis and prescription to the patient.
Considering another case where Dr.Bob is not in fact an HIV specialist. Hos.HIVDocR ← DrBob and Hos.HIVDocW ← DrBob are not included in Π. The variable DrInput is still labeled (Pat.RecsR, DrBob) and the program type-checks statically, but the execution semantics will not execute the assignments in lines 8 and 10 because Π will not prove the query conditionals on lines 7 and 9.
In a third case, if the variable PatRequestsHIVtherapy is not true, or one of the query conditionals on line 3 or 4 are not satisfied by the dynamic policy Π, the update statements on lines 4 and 6 are not executed, and the corresponding policy statements are not added. Therefore, the conditionals in lines 7 and 9 will not be true. This again ensures that the sensitive patient's record is not leaked to any unauthorized person.
Noninterference
In this section, we present the noninterference theorem for RTI. The full proof of the theorem can be found in the technical report [2] . The strategy of the proof follows that of Swamy et al. [27] , which in turn uses the proof technique of Pottier and Simonet [21] . Much of the material in this section follows Swamy et al. quite closely.
An execution of a program S 0 starting in the configuration E 0 is denoted by E 0 , S 0 and is a (possibly infinite) sequence of configurations E 0 , E 1 , . . . and programs S 0 , S 1 , . . . such that each step of execution is performed according to the operational semantics; E i , S i −→ E i+1 , S i+1 . The sequence of configurations E 0 , E 1 , . . .
Trace: Figure 6 . Trace observability obtained in this way is called a trace and is written Tr( E 0 , S 0 ). We use α to denote a possibly empty trace and E, α to denote the concatenation of a single configuration and a trace. The attacker's observation level is presumed to be given by a set of roles R. We assume a type environment Γ is given. The restriction of a trace α to observation level R is denoted by α| R , and is defined in figure 6 . As long as the policy remains unchanged, a restricted trace consists of a restriction to each configuration element of the trace. (This is the "otherwise" case of the Trace definition in the figure. In this case, the first configuration is restricted to R and then the definition recurs.) Restricting the individual configurations restricts the view of memory (according to Π and Γ), the policy, and the snapshot. Note that lab(Γ(x)) refers to the label associated with the content of variable x. The policy is restricted by removing the policy statements that are not observable to R.
If a policy update results in declassification with respect to the attacker's roles R, then the trace is truncated, as specified in the first case of the Trace definition in the figure. The set of roles given by declas(R, E 1 .Π, E 2 .Π) is non-empty when the execution step from E 1 to E 2 changes the policy in a way that makes some role change from being unobservable to being observable by the attacker. This is exactly the case in which a declassification has occurred that is observable to R. As mentioned in Section 1, the theorem guarantees noninterference for non-declassifying subtraces.
The way that trace observability is defined, computation steps that change unobservable portions of the configuration appear to make no change whatsoever. The presence of repeated, unchanged configurations is called stuttering. We write α . = β if α and β are two different trace sequences, but are identical when unchanged configurations are eliminated.
The statement of noninterference uses the notion of wellformed configuration, written Ω |= E, which says that the execution configuration is consistent with the static context used to type-check the program. (
Clause (1) ensures that all the memory locations are assigned a type. Clause (2) checks that the static approximation, Q, is consistent with the dynamic policy Π. Note that clause (2) takes account of the fact that queries in Q have associated labels.
Lemma 11 (Static Label Ordering Soundness). For all contexts Ω and programs S, if the derivation of Ω S contains a sub-derivation of Ω S , then the following holds for all policies Π:
Noninterference is proved by relating execution traces of well-formed configurations. The idea is to show that for any attacker, if two such configurations agree on the portions of them that the attacker can observe, then the execution traces restricted to the attacker's observation level will be equivalent up to stuttering.
Theorem 12 (Noninterference). Suppose that for an RTI program S and a pair of configurations E 0 and E 1 there exists a context Ω such that Ω S, Ω |= E 0 , and Ω |= E 1 . Then for any set of roles R, whenever both E 0 , S and E 1 , S terminate, we have
Intuitively, the proof shows that when executing a typecorrect RTI program S, the effects observable to a lowsecurity observer are independent of the high-security parts of the memory and policy with which the program executes. Because policy updates change the definitions of high and low security, the noninterference result guarantees only that this independence holds at each execution step with respect to the policy in effect at that step. As in [27] , our noninterference result focuses on confidentiality and observability. Because our formulation of data integrity is essentially identical, the same argument can be used to show that data and policy integrity is preserved. We do not consider timing or termination channels.
Comparison of Rx and RTI
As we already stated earlier, RTI is closely related to another previous work in type-based information flow analysis, Rx. The syntax of RTI resembles that of Rx. Rx consists of RT[ ] roles as labels of variables, RT[ ] policy statements as run-time policy statements, policy update statements and policy queries that approximate the run-time policy. However, RTI differs from Rx with respect to the ordering relation and the metapolicy. We have already illustrated some of the differences in Sections 3 and 4.2. We discuss the rest of the differences in this section.
Metapolicy. In Rx roles, like variables, are also protected by a pair of security labels. These security labels constitute what Rx calls the metapolicy of a role. Rx also uses the readers-oriented notion of integrity. We discuss some of the problems caused by these design choices in section3. RTI proposes the writer-oriented view of integrity and protecting policy statements instead of individual roles as solutions to these problems. Thus Rx's readers-oriented integrity model follows the trust model and RTI follows the writer model and DLM as described by Li et al. [16] .
Rx uses the notation C Π (ρ) to denote the confidentiality label of ρ. Because Rx uses role-level protection, Rx requires
In Rx, there is another strong, problematic constraint on the meta-label of a role. If the membership of role ρ depends on the membership of role ρ (e.g., because there is a policy statement ρ ← ρ ), then the metapolicy of ρ must be at least as restrictive as the metapolicy for ρ , i.e.,
. This is because members of ρ can observe the effect of changes to the membership of ρ via their effect on ρ. In general, ρ depends on ρ if it delegates transitively to ρ . An unfortunate consequence is that if a new statement such as A.r ← E is added to the policy in the previous paragraph, the principal E should be added not only to Swamy et al. suggest that one might mitigate this problem by using the integrity label C Π (B.r) to prevent unauthorized delegation to B.r. The idea is to require that all the data tested in conditionals leading to an update that adds a statement of the form A.r ← B.r should be trusted by everyone that trusts the value of [[B.r]] SP(Π ) . This could be accomplished by using the component of that static context known as the program counter (pc), which summarizes the security levels of data tested in conditionals leading to a given point in the program. This, however, seems unintuitive. The integrity label of B.r now has a major role in protecting the confidentiality of B.r. One expects the integrity label of an object to control how its value can be defined, not how its value can be used. Furthermore, members of roles must all agree before their role can be included in another role. In a highly decentralized environment, this does not seem conducive to scalability. Role owners should have autonomy to define their roles however they wish. Overall, this requires that the action of modifying the definition of C Π (ρ ) should be decoupled from the act of introducing a new statement ρ ← ρ .
By contrast, RTI leverages the implicit assumptions used in trust management policy. When A creates A.r ← B.r, this means that A trusts B to correctly define the membership of B.r. Therefore, the principals who trust the membership of A.r implicitly trust A, B, and all the other principals whose roles the membership of A.r depends on. Transactions. Rx uses a transaction construct for two purposes. First, it ensures that in the operational semantics, when a policy update is performed, if it causes a violation of the assumptions under which the currently executing code region was type-checked, control breaks out of that region. This is accomplished in RTI by the try construct. Second, transactions attempt to address the problem of illegal transitive flows, in which data flows from x to y under one policy and then from y to z after a policy modification, yet neither policy authorized the flow from x to z. While transactions can enable a programmer to avoid such illegal flows by placing all flows within a single transaction, Rx does not strictly enforce this and it is often not practical to enforce it either(different flows might be in different methods of the program). In RTI we have omitted transactions in the interest of simplicity and because they do not provide a comprehensive solution to the problem they are designed to address.
Related Work
Trust Management. Trust management was introduced by Blaze et al. [4] as a problem in network security for which the authors proposed an approach based on a small collection of general principles, the most important for our context being decentralization of control. The first trust management system, called PolicyMaker, was also introduced, followed by its descendant, KeyNote [3] . These systems were designed to support delegation of authorization to use specific resources. About the same time as PolicyMaker, the Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure (SDSI) [22] was introduced. Rather than delegation of authorization, SDSI focused on naming. Because SDSI names can be used to represent groups or roles, there is a strong relationship between SDSI and RT, though full RT is much richer. (RTI barely scratches the surface of RT's expressive power.) More recently, many other trust management systems have been designed and analyzed (e.g., [10, 1, 12 ] to identify just a few). We use RT because of its usage of roles, its support for highly decentralized policy definition, and its simple declarative semantics.
Language Based Security. In language based information flow analysis techniques [23] , security labels form a lattice according to the lattice model of security proposed by Denning [7] . These approaches statically check whether the program satisfies the noninterference property [9] with respect to the security lattice. Initial security lattices were simple with only two security levels, high and low [29, 8] . A high or low security label was associated with the variables based on ownership and access policies. Myers et al. [20] incorporated the policies based on ownerships and flows directly into the security lattice in their Decentralized Label Model (DLM). The security label consists of confidentiality label and integrity label pair. The confidentiality label consists of owners of the variable and the readers who could read the information in the variable. The integrity label consists of owners and writers who could write to the variable. The security label in RTI also follows the same confidentiality and integrity model for the security labels.
Most of the work in language-based information flow [23, 5] assumes that the security lattice is known at compile-time and remains fixed during program execution. Noninterference was proved with respect to the static lattice. Realistic code, however, needs to execute in different environments and the security lattice might change based on the environment. Dynamic principals and labels [19, 6, 28] that could be instantiated at run-time were proposed to allow dynamic querying of the security lattice. To type-check the programs statically, the languages provided constructs similar to our policy query. These approaches, however, did not provide a way to change the security lattice at run-time.
In contrast, similar to previous work by Hicks et al. [11] and Swamy et al. [27] , we provide an update statement to dynamically update the security lattice. We also provide fine-grained protection to the security lattice by protecting the dynamic policy statements with the help of a security label. The net effect is that different principals observe different lattices based on their observation level. Although Rx also protects the lattice, their protection is more coarsegrained because any principal that is allowed to access a particular role, is permitted by the metapolicy of Rx to observe the entire sub-lattice dominated by the role.
Many previous approaches propose some form of declassification construct based on various constraints (see [24] for a survey). This construct allows temporary change in the security lattice order, such that if a particular value is sufficiently general, according to some constraints, it can be released on a low security output channel. For instance, this might be done if the value has been encrypted. However, one might not want to release other values that have the same security label. Our approach, supports a related, but rather different operation: update statements permanently change the security lattice. If an update results in a value becoming less strictly protected, all the values that are protected by the roles involved are affected. In order to provide declassification in the classical sense, we can extend our approach with a declassification construct that changes the lattice temporarily.
Another useful construct could be providing polymorphic labels and label inferencing [19, 26] . We believe that our approach can be extended to allow such labels. For instance, in our example in Section 6, the piece of code that is executed by Dr. Bob is common to all the doctors, and if we were to allow labels that could be instantiated at run-time, the code could be reused.
Almeida Matos et al. [18] propose a flow construct that can dynamically introduce flows in a portion of the program. The flow, however, is local to the block of code for which it has been defined. One difference is that the programmer can arbitrarily introduce the flows irrespective of the context, whereas in our approach only authorized principals can add the flows. Moreover, the new flows could be visible only to authorized principals. Almeida Matos et al. prove the non-disclosure policy, which states that at each step of execution, the program satisfies the noninterference property with respect to the flow policy that holds for that step. In the absence of declassification, our approach proves the same property. However, when there are declassifying updates, the program terminates and no guarantees are given regarding the noninterference. In this case the noninterference theorem proves noninterference until conditions, proposed by Chong et al. [6] .
Conclusion
We have identified shortcomings in the recently proposed security-typed language Rx [27] . To address these problems, we have proposed a new security-typed language, RTI, given static type-checking rules and dynamic execution semantics for RTI, and proved noninterference until declassification for RTI.
In comparison to Rx, RTI more fully embraces the trustmanagement philosophy towards authority and delegation. RTI adopts a writers-oriented approach for integrity policies. This gives role owners the autonomy they need to manage their role definitions without outside interference. RTI protects individual policy statements that define aspects of a role, rather than protecting an entire role as a single unit. This means that the membership of the roles can be kept more private. For example, in RTI a member of a role is not necessarily entitled to learn all the other members of that role, or to see all the statements used to define that role. Finally, we also proposed an idiom for security labels that will assist programmers in defining consistent labellings for policy statements and variables.
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